





































Gerard Thomas HORVATH 
 
Working Paper No. 1111 
September 2011 
 
D DE EP PA AR RT TM ME EN NT T   O OF F   E EC CO ON NO OM MI IC CS S   
J JO OH HA AN NN NE ES S   K KE EP PL LE ER R   U UN NI IV VE ER RS SI IT TY Y   O OF F   
L LI IN NZ Z   
Johannes Kepler University of Linz 
Department of Economics 
Altenberger Strasse 69 
A-4040 Linz - Auhof, Austria 
www.econ.jku.at 
gerard_thomas.horvath@jku.at 
phone +43 (0)70 2468 -5372, -25372 (fax) 
 Immigration and the Distribution of





Using detailed micro data on earnings and employment, I analyze
the eﬀects of immigration on the wage distribution of native male
workers in Austria. I ﬁnd that immigration has heterogeneous eﬀects
on wages, diﬀering by type of work as well as the wage level. While
there are small , but insigniﬁcant, negative eﬀects for blue collar work-
ers at the lower end of the wage distribution there are positive eﬀects
on wages at higher percentiles. For white collar workers positive ef-
fects occur at most percentiles. The estimated eﬀects of immigration
are relatively small in size and not signiﬁcant for most workers. Over-
all it seems that most of potentially adverse eﬀects of immigration on
natives’ wages are oﬀset by complementarities stemming from immi-
gration of workers with diﬀerent skill levels.
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Austria, as well as many other European countries, faced a sharp increase in
immigration within the last decades. Between 1972 and 2009 the share of im-
migrants in Austria rose from around 2.5 to over 10%1. Alongside this tran-
sition many concerns arose about the social and economic consequences that
are (thought to be) associated with this change in the population structure.
Only recently the EU-enlargement and the associated freedom to migrate
within the EU raised additional concerns on the fortunes of native workers.
Dustmann et al. (2003) state “the possible negative eﬀects of immigration
on wages and employment outcomes of resident workers is one of the core
concerns in the public debate on immigration”(p.8). Naturally these transi-
tions had a great impact on economic research, leading to a huge number of
studies analyzing theoretically and empirically causes and consequences of
increasing immigration.
The impact of immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes are broadly
discussed in economic studies. While most studies on the eﬀects of immigra-
tion on wages ﬁnd only weak - if any - eﬀects of increasing immigration on
natives’ wages (see Friedberg and Hunt (1995)) others do ﬁnd strong adverse
eﬀects for native workers (Borjas (2003)). When workers are heterogeneous
with respect to skills, ability and education one would expect to observe dif-
ferent impacts of immigration on native workers’ wages (see e.g. Dustmann,
Glitz and Frattini (2008)). Depending on immigrants’ skill composition an
increase in the number of immigrants increases the supply of certain types of
1Statistics Austria, “Statistik des Bev¨ olkerungsstandes”.
1labor which in turn leads to increasing or decreasing demand for native work-
ers with given characteristics - depending on patterns of substitutability or
complementarity in the production process (Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller
(1996)). It is therefore most likely that the eﬀect of immigration varies be-
tween diﬀerent skill groups (see e.g. Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005))
which should be reﬂected by heterogeneous impacts of the share of immi-
grants along the wage distribution. Assessing relative winners and losers
from increased immigration is important. Understanding the heterogeneous
consequences of immigration may imply policies that help to cushion poten-
tially negative impacts on concerned workers.
Notice however that it is not suﬃcient to regress the change in immigrant
shares separately for e.g. high and low income earners in order to assess
the impact of immigration on high and low income workers. As Koenker
and Hallock (2001) point out, this strategy of “segmented OLS regression”
may lead to severely biased results, due to sample selection bias that arises
from non-random sorting of workers along the wage distribution (Heckman
(1979)).
While the eﬀects of immigration on (un)employment rates and average wages
of native workers have been studied extensively so far, only few studies deal
with the causal eﬀects of immigration on the wage distribution of native
workers. Following the approach of Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008)
I assess how the change in the region speciﬁc share of immigrants over time
aﬀects the wage distribution of male native workers in Austria. Using detailed
data on the yearly total gross income of all non self employed workers in
2Austria allows me to analyze these eﬀects consistently for diﬀerent groups of
workers over a time period of 12 years.
I ﬁnd that immigration has heterogeneous eﬀects on wages, diﬀering by type
of work as well as the wage level. While there are small , but insigniﬁcant,
negative eﬀects for blue collar workers at the lower end of the wage distribu-
tion there are positive eﬀects on wages at higher percentiles. For white collar
workers positive eﬀects occur at most percentiles. The estimated eﬀects of
immigration are relatively small in size and not signiﬁcant for most workers.
Overall it seems that most of potentially adverse eﬀects of immigration on
natives’ wages are oﬀset by complementarities stemming from immigration
of workers with diﬀerent skill levels.
2 Previous Literature
Previous work on the eﬀects of immigration on labor market outcomes in
Austria mostly focus on average wage and employment eﬀects. For example
Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller (1996) ﬁnd that Austrians earn higher wages
in regions and industries with higher immigrant shares.2 Results on wage
growth however appear to be mixed, yielding positve eﬀects at the indus-
try level but negative eﬀects at the ﬁrm level. While immobile workers (i.e.
job-stayers) experience small adverse eﬀects from immigration, mobile work-
ers’ (job-changers) wage growth rates are not or even positively aﬀected by
immigration. In a subsequent study Winter-Ebmer and Zweim¨ uller (1999)
2Their estimates suggest an increase of natives’ wages between 2.1-3.7% at the regional
and 0.2-1.0% at the industry level in response to an increase in the share of foreign workers
by 1%.
3consider employment prospects of young native workers and ﬁnd only weak
displacement eﬀects from increased immigration. Both papers focus on the
years 1988 to 1991 which corresponds to the steepest increase of immigration
into Austria due to the fall of the iron curtain and the Baltic wars.
Hofer and Huber (2003) use a representative sample of Austrian workers
for the years 1991 to 1994 and ﬁnd that immigration has a small negative
(positive) eﬀect on the wage growth of native blue (white) collar workers.
In a more recent paper Wagner (2010) ﬁnds negative eﬀects of immigration
on already resident migrants but no eﬀect on natives’ wages in Austria.
Overall empirical evidence shows that the Austrian labor market reacts com-
plexly to migration, yielding diﬀerent impacts for diﬀerent time periods and
types of workers (see Hofer and Huber (2003)).
In recent years the literature has shifted toward assessing the heterogeneous
eﬀects of immigration across diﬀerent types of workers or on wage inequality.
Most papers in this context distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers
(see e.g. Altonji and Card (1991), Card (2001) or Jaeger (2007)). Card (2009)
e.g. ﬁnds for the US that immigrants and natives within education groups
are imperfect substitutes and that immigration has only minor eﬀects on
wage inequality. Only few studies directly assess the eﬀect of immigration on
the distribution of wages. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) study the
eﬀect of immigration on local labor markets’ wage distributions in the UK by
regressing changes of the percentiles of region speciﬁc wage distributions over
time on changes in the share of immigrants. They ﬁnd that wages below the
20th percentile are depressed while the upper part of the distribution exhibits
4modest wage increases. Borjas (2003) exploits diﬀerences in the supply of
foreign labor by education-experience groups and ﬁnds large negative wage
eﬀects for native workers. While these eﬀects are small - and sometimes even
positive - for some workers, there are large adverse eﬀects for e.g. high school
drop outs.
3 Empirical Strategy
Manacorda et al. (2006) show that immigrants tend to downgrade consid-
erably when arriving in the host country. This can severely bias estimation
results if immigrants are assigned to skill groups according to their observable
characteristics.To assess the impact of immigration on the wage distribution
in Austria I therefore follow the approach developed by Dustmann, Frattini
and Preston 2008.3 In a ﬁrst step I derive for each year (1994 to 2005) the
percentiles of the regional (35 NUTS3 regions) wage distributions of native
male blue and white collar workers aged 16 to 59. These percentiles are
then regressed on region and time speciﬁc shares of immigrant workers and
additional controls. Formally,
ln(Wprt) = αpr + βpSrt + γpXrt + ǫprt  (1)
where Wprt is the pth percentile of the wage distribution in region r at time
t, αpr is a region speciﬁc intercept, Srt is region speciﬁc share of immigrant
3Alternatively one could also apply quantile regressions to assess the impact of im-
migration on the distribution of wages. Notice however that quantile regressions with
instrumental variables in a panel data environment - as is needed in this study - turn out
to be numerically instable and therefore not used here.
5workers and Xrt are region and time speciﬁc characteristics such as average
age, tenure, experience and years of schooling. β gives the eﬀect of immigra-
tion on each percentile of the wage distribution and is estimated using 420
observations (35 regions over 12 years).
In equation (1) individual observations are aggregated to the regional level.
This aggregation eliminates the bias that occurs if e.g. immigrants’ allocation
to ﬁrms is correlated with native workers’ abilities or skills. To see why
consider an identiﬁcation strategy where wage eﬀects of immigration are
estimated by comparing wages across ﬁrms with diﬀerent shares of immigrant
workers. If immigrants tend to work in ﬁrms with higher shares of low ability
natives, esimtates would be biased downward. Aggregation to regional levels
averages out these eﬀects. For a similar argument see Card and Rothstein
(2007).
OLS estimation of equation (1) is likely to yield biased estimates of the eﬀect
of immigration on workers’ wages for several reasons. Firstly, immigrants’
allocation to certain regions may occur endogenously (see e.g Dustmann et al.
(2003)). Since the inﬂow of immigrants into certain regions may be correlated
with unobserved region speciﬁc shocks in the demand for labor - causing
changes in wages and changes in immigrant inﬂows simultaneously - OLS
estimates will be upward or downward biased. If, for example, immigrants
are attracted by regions with currently high economic activity OLS estimates
will be upward biased. If on the other hand declining industries supply their
demand for labor by employing low wage immigrants OLS estimates will be
downward biased. Instrumental variable estimation can solve this problem
6of endogenous allocation of immigrants to regions.
Following Altonji and Card (1991) and Wagner (2010) I instrument the cur-















r 1972−81 denotes the net inﬂow of workers from country j within the
time period 1972 to 1981 into region r. In equation (2) the current share
of immigrants from each country j is predicted using the historic settlement
patterns from 1972 to 1981. Summing these shares over all countries of
origin gives a predicted share of immigrants within a certain region at time
t.4 Thus, current shares of migrant workers are instrumented by immigrants’
historic settlement patterns. Numerous studies on the labor market eﬀects
of immigration apply this strategy (see e.g. Card (2001), Dustmann, Frattini
and Preston (2008), or Friedberg and Hunt (1995)). The resulting ﬁrst and
second stage equations are given by,
Srt = a0 + a1Xrt + a2Zrt + urt (3)
ln(Wprt) = αpr + βp ˆ Srt + γpXrt + ǫprt (4)
Secondly, region speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects that are both, correlated with the share
of immigrants within the region as well as with economic outcomes of na-
tives could imply a positive or negative spatial correlation between a region’s
share of immigrants and natives’ labor market outcomes even if there is no
4See next subsection for a motivation for this instrument.
7causal eﬀect of immigration at all. For example, areas with high popula-
tion densities may oﬀer better economic infrastructure with higher wages
and lower unemployment rates for natives and attract more immigrants than
rural areas. Region ﬁxed eﬀects control for such eﬀects.
Finally, OLS estimates of equation (1) could also be biased due to native
residents’ reaction to increased immigration. If (higher wage earning) natives
respond to increasing (low wage) immigration by moving to areas with lower
immigrant shares, OLS will result in upward biased estimates. To address
this issue I present consistency tests that were proposed by Card (2001) and
show that native outmigration is not likely to bias the results (see section
6.1).
3.1 Interpretation and Validity of the instrument
Validity of the instrumental variable strategy requires that the instrument
chosen is uncorrelated with any determinant of the outcome variable other
than the instrumented variable itself, i.e. the share of immigrants within
each region. To fulﬁll this exclusion restriction the instrument may therefore
not be correlated with e.g. current economic conditions.
As has been noted by Bartel (1989) immigrants tend to settle in regions where
other immigrants have already settled. The main reason for this behavior is
that immigrants prefer to settle in regions where they can rely on existing
social networks according to their own language and culture. The instrument
used here builds on this observation.
Equation (2) derives the predicted number of immigrants in period t within
8each region under the assumption that the distribution of the total number
of immigrants arriving at time t is the same as the distribution within the
baseline period. This predicted inﬂow is independent of current region spe-
ciﬁc demand shocks but strongly correlated with observed immigrant inﬂows.
Choosing a long base line period (10 years in this case) ensures that historic
shocks do not aﬀect the prediction. The predicted share of immigrants is
therefore independent of current economic conditions within regions because
the prediction is entirely based on historic settlement patterns.
Since the instrument is motivated by a social network argument it is conve-
nient to distinguish immigrants by their country of origin. If, for example,
thirty percent of German immigrants arriving in the baseline period settled
in Vienna, the instrument allocates thirty percent of new immigrants arriving
from Germany in a given year to Vienna (Cortes (2008)).
Besides fulﬁlling the exclusion restriction the instrument must also be strongly
correlated with observed immigration patterns. If the instrument is weak in
the sense that the correlation with endogenous variable is low, instrumen-
tal variable estimates may be biased in small samples (Angrist and Pischke
(2009)). It is therefore important to verify the strength of the instrument
used. Figure 1 shows observed versus predicted shares of immigrants by re-
gion according to the equation (2). As shown in the graph the instrument
is highly correlated with observed changes in immigrant shares. All regres-
sions presented below show ﬁrst stage F-statistics to verify the strength of
the instrument.5
5Stock et al. (2002) suggest to use instruments only if the ﬁrst stage F-statistic exceeds
10.
94 Data and construction of main variables
To analyze the impact of immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes I
use four diﬀerent administrative data sources covering all non self-employed
workers in Austria.6 Detailed wage information is obtained from pay-slips
(“Lohnzettel”) covering the years 1994 to 2005. Here the total gross earnings
for all non-self employed workers in Austria are collected. The main virtue of
this data source is that the wage information is not top coded which allows
me to derive the precise wage distribution for each region. The wage data are
combined with Austrian social security data (ASSD) that allow me to observe
workers’ entire labor market history back to 1972. (For a detailed descrip-
tion see Zweim¨ uller et al. (2009).) From these I derive worker speciﬁc labor
market characteristics such as labor market experience and the current em-
ployment tenure. Additionally, data from the Austrian Public Employment
Service (AMS) provide information on migration background, unemployment
beneﬁts and eduction for the time period 1987 to 1998. Finally data from
the Labor Market Database (Arbeitsmarktdatenbank - AMDB) provide in-
formation on workers’ migration background from 1997 onward.
Figure 2 depicts the change in immigrants’ share of the workforce separately
for each decile of the wage distribution for two diﬀerent years, 1994 and 2005.
Two facts are noteworthy here. The graph conﬁrms that immigrants tend to
be low wage workers. We see that this is less true as we move from 1994 to
2005 suggesting that low wage immigration decreases relatively to mean and
high wage immigration.
6Excluded are civil servants, self-employed and farmers
105 Results
Table 1 shows estimation results for blue and white collar workers in columns
1 and 2. Results for white collar workers reveal some positive eﬀects at the 7th
decile but no signiﬁcant eﬀects at the other parts of the distribution. These
estimates imply a pattern similar to that observed for blue collar workers.
It appears that immigration has a small negative eﬀect at the second decile
while it increasingly raises wages as we move to higher deciles. This implies
that the overall mean eﬀect of immigration is close to zero. These ﬁndings are
consistent with results obtained by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008)
for the UK.7
It may be argued that the overall degree of immigration is not the relevant
measure to consider since workers’ wages are aﬀected mostly by the number
of immigrants with whom they directly compete with in the labor market.8
Instead of measuring the degree of immigration at the regional level only, I
therefore derive two alternative measures of immigration intensity and repeat
the above analysis. The ﬁrst measure derives the region and decile speciﬁc
share of immigrants and the second includes also those immigrants from lower
deciles.9 Results are presented in columns 3 (4) and 5 (6) in table 1 for blue
(white) collar workers. As expected the estimates imply stronger negative
eﬀects for some workers but the overall picture remains the same. Under this
7They actually ﬁnd even positive eﬀects of immigration on mean wages.
8Notice however that this argument ignores any potential positive eﬀects of immigration
on workers’ wages stemming from complementarities from immigration at all other deciles.
9Including immigrants from lower deciles may be important if immigrants are paid less
than natives for the same jobs, especially if downgrading occurs upon arrival (see e.g.
Manacorda et al. (2006) or Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008)).
11more restrictive deﬁnition of immigrant shares, the eﬀect of a one percentage
point increase in immigrant shares results in approximately 0.8, 0.6 and 0.3
percent wage loss for blue collar workers at the ﬁrst, second and third decile.
Contrasting the previous results I now also ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects
for blue collar workers at the upper end of the wage distribution.
For white collar workers, all measures of immigration intensity yield similar
results.
It appears that under the more restrictive deﬁnition of immigrant shares blue
and white collar workers at the low end of the wage distribution experience
some wage losses from immigration while high income blue and above median
white collar workers gain from immigration.
A convenient interpretation of these ﬁndings is shown in ﬁgure 3 (4). The
graph shows the results derived in column 5 (6) of table 1 (“competition
eﬀect”) together with the diﬀerence between the overall eﬀect in column 1
(2) and the competition eﬀect. The latter is labeled the “complementarity
eﬀect”. As the graph shows, those workers who experience strong negative
competition eﬀects also gain most from the complementarity eﬀect. Thus,
most of the adverse eﬀects implied by direct competition between natives
and foreigners is oﬀset by complementarities.
6 Robustness and consistency
Consistency of the estimates presented above requires that native workers
do not react to immigration by moving to other areas. I therefore perform
12a consistency test suggested by Card (2001). Consistency of the results also
requires that the overall composition of the workforce does not change in
response to immigration. Negative as well as positive eﬀects of immigration
on natives’ wages could be driven by natives dropping out of employment. If
e.g. immigration drives low educated (or low ability) natives out of employ-
ment, observed positive wage eﬀects at higher deciles may simply result from
a change in the composition of workers observed in employment. Negative
wage eﬀects of immigration could be understated for the same reason. If low
ability workers within each decile drop out of employment as a consequence
of increased immigration, the wage eﬀects underestimate the true negative
eﬀects of immigration. The second subsection deals with this issue by ana-
lyzing labor market transition rates for native workers within each decile of
the wage distribution.
6.1 Natives’ respondence to immigrant inﬂows
The identiﬁcation strategy applied here relies on the assumption that native
workers do not react to increasing immigration by moving out of certain
regions. To assess whether this assumption holds I follow Card (2001) and
regress native workers’ outﬂow rates on immigrant workers inﬂow rates and
a set of control variables.10 Native workers’ response to immigrant inﬂows
10If a worker is observed as working in a diﬀerent region from one year to the next, I code
this as an outﬂow. Transitions of workers to other labor market states (unemployment,




rt = Xrtβ + γSrt + ρr + τt + ǫ  (5)
where ON denotes native workers outﬂow rate, X captures region charac-
teristics (mean age, tenure, experience and wage), Srt denotes immigrant
workers inﬂow rate into region r at time t and ρ and τ denote region and
time dummy variables.
Table 2 shows OLS and IV estimation results for native blue and white
workers in diﬀerent deciles of the wage distribution. Immigration does not
lead to increasing outmigration at any decile. For workers at the lower end
of the wage distribution - for blue collar workers at the second to fourth
decile and white collar workers at the second and third decile - immigration
is associated with a modest decrease in outmigration rates.11
6.2 Labor force participation eﬀects
As argued above, consistency of the estimation strategy requires that the
overall composition of the workforce does not change in response to immigra-
tion. To assess the eﬀect of immigration on the overall workforce composition
within regions, I therefore derive for each region native workers’ transition
rates into and out of employment. These transition rates are then related to
the share of immigrants entering the region in a given year.
Table 3 shows estimation results for natives’ employment to unemployment
11For e.g. blue collar workers at the second decile a one percentage point increase in
the share of foreign workers is associated with a 0.06% decrease in outmigration.
14(ETU) and unemployment to employment (UTE) transitions separately for
blue (columns 1 and 2) and white collar workers (columns 3 and 4).12 With
exception of UTE transitions of white collar workers at the second, seventh
and eighth decile and ETU transition for blue collar workers at the eighth
percentile I do not ﬁnd adverse labor force participation eﬀects in response
to increased immigration. These eﬀects appear to be small in size or only
weakly signiﬁcant. Results obtained in tables 1 are therefore not likely to be
driven by labor force composition eﬀects.
7 Conclusion
I assess the impact of region speciﬁc immigrant shares along the distribution
of wages in Austria over a time period of 12 years. My ﬁndings indicate that
there are small but insigniﬁcantly negative wage eﬀects of immigration for
blue and white collar workers at the lower end of the income distribution.
I ﬁnd positive income eﬀects for high income blue and some white collar
workers. All eﬀects found here are small in size and, with one exception, not
signiﬁcant.
Using more restrictive measures of immigration intensity as an indication of
the exposure to immigration results in stronger adverse eﬀects for low income
earners, especially for blue collar workers. The estimated gains for higher
income earners remain more or less unchanged. It has to be stated, that
these measures, while possibly being more accurate measures of the degree
12Wage percentiles for unemployment to employment transitions are deﬁned by consid-
ering the last wage earned by the unemployed worker. Workers who are unemployed for
more than 2 years are not considered.
15of direct labor market competition between natives and immigrants, neglect
potential gains from immigration via complementarities between diﬀerent
skill groups. These latter estimates do not represent the overall eﬀect of
immigration on wages at a given decile but the wage impact that results
from the direct competition with immigrant workers only.
My results imply that potentially negative eﬀects induced by increased immi-
gration are oﬀset by complementarities in the production process stemming
from immigration of workers with diﬀerent skills. As a result the overall
wage eﬀects are close to zero or even positive. These results are in line with
results obtained by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) for the UK labor
market.
Immigration therefore appears to have only small eﬀects on natives’ wages
even though natives are aﬀected diﬀerently, depending on their position in
the wage distribution and on the type of work. Immigration of low skilled
labor may adversely aﬀect low income earners while high skilled immigration
raises wages at higher income levels. On the other hand, low income earners
proﬁt from immigration of higher skilled workers due to complementarities
in the production process.
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188 Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Eﬀect of immigration on diﬀerent deciles of workers wage distribu-
tion by diﬀerent measures of migrant shares.
Overall Own Percentile Own plus lower
Blue White Blue White Blue White
p1 0.6735 0.4519 -0.7463** -0.3878 -0.7463** -0.3878
(0.6363) (0.5042) (0.3560) (0.2438) (0.3560) (0.2438)
p2 -0.2678 -0.0708 -0.6468** -0.0621 -0.6636*** -0.0934
(0.3243) (0.2164) (0.2561) (0.0934) (0.2339) (0.1435)
p3 -0.2785 0.0881 -0.3132** -0.1412* -0.4107** -0.3117***
(0.2277) (0.1737) (0.1499) (0.0843) (0.1705) (0.1137)
p4 0.0323 0.0095 -0.0776 0.0146 -0.2292** -0.1544
(0.1768) (0.1637) (0.1816) (0.2517) (0.1137) (0.1138)
p5 0.0156 0.0651 0.0039 0.1122 0.0039 0.1000
(0.1576) (0.1693) (0.1641) (0.2981) (0.1649) (0.2638)
p6 0.1579 0.2313 0.1060 0.2311 0.1631 0.3986
(0.1504) (0.1695) (0.1042) (0.1765) (0.1648) (0.3204)
p7 0.0935 0.3904** 0.0720 0.2822** 0.0935 0.3900**
(0.1482) (0.1845) (0.0778) (0.1372) (0.1019) (0.1949)
p8 0.1214 0.2074 0.1387 0.1643 0.1223 0.1499
(0.1603) (0.1908) (0.0943) (0.1517) (0.0837) (0.1385)
p9 0.2082 0.2381 0.3805* 0.3515 0.2082 0.3515
(0.2010) (0.2320) (0.2188) (0.3458) (0.2010) (0.3458)
YD yes yes yes yes yes yes
RD yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other yes yes yes yes yes yes
FStat 13.65 13.65 44.43 32.11 60.84 49.50
Notes: Estimated eﬀects of the region speciﬁc immigrant shares on diﬀerent deciles
of native blue collar workers. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Speciﬁcations with “other” control for
region speciﬁc means in age (squared), tenure (squared), experience (squared) and years
of schooling.
19Table 2: Eﬀect of immigration on native workers’ outﬂow rates by wage
category1.
blue white
OLS IV OLS IV F-Stat
p 1 0.0128* 0.0185 0.0119 0.0198 15.8
(0.0074) (0.0218) (0.0074) (0.0213)
p 2 0.0026 -0.0635** 0.0025 -0.0597** 11.69
(0.0090) (0.0265) (0.0089) (0.0257)
p 3 -0.0105* -0.0658** -0.0108* -0.0661** 8.87
(0.0056) (0.0273) (0.0058) (0.0270)
p 4 -0.0095** -0.0233* -0.0083** -0.0245 9.1
(0.0040) (0.0137) (0.0040) (0.0145)
p 5 -0.0038 -0.0197 -0.0030 -0.0195 8.58
(0.0032) (0.0135) (0.0032) (0.0137)
p 6 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0158 11.05
(0.0032) (0.0119) (0.0032) (0.0120)
p 7 -0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0004 -0.0077 13.98
(0.0035) (0.0162) (0.0035) (0.0163)
p 8 -0.0044 -0.0104 -0.0055 -0.0116 15.29
(0.0037) (0.0160) (0.0036) (0.0159)
p 9 -0.0062 0.0036 -0.0077* -0.0007 12.63
(0.0055) (0.0114) (0.0046) (0.0147)
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcient of the impact of immigration on native blue workers out-
ﬂow rates within each wage category. Wage categories are deﬁned by deciles of native
workers’ wage distribution. Additional controls: age (squared), tenure(squared), experi-
ence(squared), years of schooling, region and time dummies. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
20Table 3: Eﬀect of immigration on native blue collar workers’ labor market
transition rates.
Blue White
ETU UTE ETU UTE F-Stat
p1 0.0161** 0.1106 -0.0052 -0.0791 8.23
(0.0081) (0.0809) (0.0053) (0.0602)
p2 0.0141 0.1083 -0.0247*** -0.0990* 12.54
(0.0163) (0.0904) (0.0086) (0.0591)
p3 0.0344** 0.1986* -0.0091 -0.0950 11.22
(0.0139) (0.1103) (0.0094) (0.0875)
p4 0.0347*** 0.1721* 0.0082 -0.0896 12.41
(0.0124) (0.0889) (0.0087) (0.0701)
p5 0.0182 0.1026 0.0059 -0.0312 12.99
(0.0133) (0.0637) (0.0076) (0.0414)
p6 0.0087 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0248 15.47
(0.0076) (0.0308) (0.0059) (0.0291)
p7 0.0037 -0.0357 0.0013 -0.0370* 12.55
(0.0044) (0.0220) (0.0026) (0.0222)
p8 -0.0018 -0.0195** -0.0007 -0.0408* 13.78
(0.0017) (0.0090) (0.0016) (0.0234)
p9 0.0041*** 0.0021 -0.0030 0.0311 10.01
(0.0014) (0.0074) (0.0036) (0.0326)
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcient of the impact of immigration on native blue collar work-
ers labor market transition rates within each wage category. Wage categories are de-
ﬁned by deciles of native workers’ wage distribution. Additional controls: age (squared),
tenure(squared), experience(squared), years of schooling, region and time dummies. Ro-
bust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and
10% level respectively.
21Figure 1: Observed and predicted year to year change in the region speciﬁc
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22Figure 3: Estimated competition and complementarity eﬀects (blue collar).
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Figure 4: Estimated competition and complementarity eﬀects (white collar).
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